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Abstract
The universality versus culture specificity of quantitative evaluations (negative-positive) of 
40 events in world history was addressed using World History Survey data collected from 
5,800 university students in 30 countries/societies. Multidimensional scaling using generalized 
procrustean analysis indicated poor fit of data from the 30 countries to an overall mean 
configuration, indicating lack of universal agreement as to the associational meaning of 
events in world history. Hierarchical cluster analysis identified one Western and two non-
Western country clusters for which adequate multidimensional fit was obtained after item 
deletions. A two-dimensional solution for the three country clusters was identified, where the 
primary dimension was historical calamities versus progress and a weak second dimension was 
modernity versus resistance to modernity. Factor analysis further reduced the item inventory 
to identify a single concept with structural equivalence across cultures, Historical Calamities, 
which included man-made and natural, intentional and unintentional, predominantly violent but 
also nonviolent calamities. Less robust factors were tentatively named as Historical Progress 
and Historical Resistance to Oppression. Historical Calamities and Historical Progress were at 
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the individual level both significant and independent predictors of willingness to fight for one’s 
country in a hierarchical linear model that also identified significant country-level variation in these 
relationships. Consensus around calamity but disagreement as to what constitutes historical 
progress is discussed in relation to the political culture of nations and lay perceptions of history 
as catastrophe.
Keywords
cross-cultural dimensions of meaning, evaluation of historical events, perceptions of history, 
World History Survey, Historical Calamities, Historical Progress, Historical Resistance to 
Oppression, willingness to fight for one’s country
A major contribution of cross-cultural psychology to the global science of psychology has been 
the identification of dimensions of cultural variation on which national cultures can be located. 
Two of the most sophisticated investigations of this type have converged on the finding that while 
cultures may differ on average as to the extent that members endorse certain values (Schwartz, 
1992) or beliefs (Leung & Bond, 2004), there is substantial universality in the associational meaning 
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of important concepts across cultures. In the domain of values, for example, Schwartz (1992) 
found good agreement across 11 of 12 national cultures as to which values were compatible (i.e., 
positively correlated) or incompatible (negatively correlated)1 on a multidimensional space con-
sisting of two dimensions. In the domain of social axioms or context-free general beliefs, Leung 
and Bond (2004) identified a pan-cultural five-factor structure, where specific beliefs consis-
tently correlated together on the same general conceptual factors across cultures. These findings 
(a) enable systematic classification of cultures into “regions” of psychological similarity and 
dissimilarity and (b) facilitate the prediction of behavior across cultures, both at the individual 
and culture (or country) level. Given the benefits of such an approach, a primary goal of the cur-
rent research is to ascertain whether there are similarly universal dimensions of meaning for the 
evaluation of events in world history (Liu et al., 2005; Liu, Paez et al., 2009; Pennebaker et al., 
2006). In addition, we examine whether concepts constructed from historical evaluations are able 
to predict citizens’ willingness to fight for their country, an important aspect of national political 
cultures (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2001; Liu & Sibley, 2009).
Given that most contemporary instances of large-scale intergroup violence involve national, 
ethnic, or religious cultures, it is surprising that the intersection between culture and group con-
flict is sparsely theorized (Hilton & Liu, 2008, but see Brewer & Yuki, 2007). To fill this gap, 
Liu and colleagues (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu & László, 2007; Liu & Sibley, 2009) have argued 
that history furnishes raw materials that are communicated through interpersonal and institutional 
channels to produce symbolic representations consisting of narratives and iconic images that 
maintain continuity between a people’s past, present, and future (see also László, Ehmann, & 
Imre, 2002; Wertsch, 2002). They argue that social representations (Moscovici, 1988) of history 
provide important symbolic reserves that can be mobilized to help define and redefine national 
political cultures as they cope with new challenges (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002). Much 
research to date has focused on articulating the function of culturally unique symbols like the 
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999) that underpins 
conceptions of a bicultural national identity (Sibley & Liu, 2007) or the February 28 incident in 
Taiwan (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004) that provides fuel for Taiwanese desires for sovereignty. 
These studies suggest that social representations of history furnish the symbolic basis for unique 
aspects of political culture within nations that are causally connected to present-day conflicts/
prejudice and political decisions about them (Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008). The ethnocen-
trism inherent in the construction of national historical narratives (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Paez & 
Liu, in press) leaves room for doubt as to whether any universal perception of the meaning of 
world history is even possible. Rather, each nation might regard different events as central, and 
even if there is agreement about the centrality of an event, each nation might evaluate its mean-
ing differently (see Liu et al., 2005, p. 188).
On the other hand, Liu et al. (2005) and Liu, Paez et al. (2009) have used open-ended nomina-
tions to determine the most important figures and events in world history from 24 societies and 
found that across cultures world history (a) is a story about politics and war (especially World 
War II and Hitler), (b) focused on the recent past (e.g., the last hundred years), and (c) is charac-
terized by Eurocentrism tempered with nationalism. However, using open-ended questions did 
not allow evaluation of the associative meaning of events in world history. Is there a deeper, 
universal structure to the evaluation of important events in world history, or are historical events 
uniquely perceived through cultural lenses? Would a temporal structure emerge with distance in 
time forming a crucial dimension, or could there be a content structure separating politics and 
war from other events? Unlike values (Schwartz, 1992), there is not a rich psychological litera-
ture on perceptions of history to guide theory construction. Professional historians have proposed 
numerous theories of history, but these accounts are more controversial than consensual (e.g., 
Great Man versus Marxist theories, unidirectional progress versus cyclical change; see Blanco & 
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Rosa, 1997). Furthermore, there are fundamental differences between professional and lay con-
ceptions of world history (see Liu et al., 2005, p. 187; Liu & Hilton, 2005, p. 541). Ordinary 
people may be considered experts at receiving and transmitting their culture’s values or general 
beliefs, but only particular social categories, like politicians and professional historians, might be 
expert at selectively utilizing histories to explain, justify, and construct agenda for present-day 
political situations (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001)—hence, there might be less coherence or 
constraint in lay people’s understandings of history. Our program to investigate whether there 
are universal dimensions in the evaluation of historical events is exploratory. We have only rudi-
mentary ideas about what factors might shape the structure of these perceptions, like the central-
ity of World War II, the impact of recency, and the tension between nationalistic versus Eurocentric 
conceptions of history.
This is not to say that our approach is a-theoretical. Rather, our theoretical approach allows us 
to provide an alternative treatment for historical events that are not universal even as we search 
for universal dimensions of meaning. Regardless of the structure of lay perceptions of world his-
tory, we have a functional theory about the preeminent role of the collective remembering of 
warfare in national political cultures. A classic study by Archer and Gardner (1984) using cross-
national archival data after World War II found that combatant nations, especially victorious 
ones with high casualty rates, were more likely to experience increases in homicide rates com-
pared to control nations, even after accounting for economic deprivation, civil unrest, or return-
ing male combatants. Building on this using their own country-level cross-cultural data, Paez, 
Liu, Techio, Slawuta, Zlobina, and Cabecinhas (2008) found that free recall of World War II (but 
not World War I) as important was positively correlated with both willingness to fight in future 
conflicts for one’s country and high power distance. Hence, it appears that the collective remem-
bering of recent wars (as just or necessary) tends to legitimize the use of violence in society, and 
that this may be connected to national political cultures where high power distance “promotes 
differences in power and hierarchical roles emphasizing obedience and respect for authorities 
and the legitimacy of using power to attain goals, including in-group or national goals” (Paez 
et al., 2008, p. 375). It is an open question whether these associations will be restricted to World 
War II, as Paez et al. (2008) found using a relatively limited data set, or be more broadly related 
to dimensions of historical perception. So unlike in other domains, a failure to find universal 
dimensions of historical perception does not undermine the theory of history and identity, but it 
would be important to know whether specific events or overall perceptions influence action 
tendencies.
To summarize, these are the two initial parallel goals of the current investigation:
Goal 1: to ascertain whether there are universal dimensions in the evaluation of historical 
events across cultures.
Goal 2: to determine whether these dimensions can be used to construct cross-culturally 
valid scales that predict willingness to fight for one’s country beyond the specific evalu-
ation of World War II.
More generally, we open a new avenue of inquiry into the process and consequences of 
excluding specific items that lack universal meaning from cross-cultural inventories. For example, 
Leung and Bond (2004, p. 133) began with 182 items and reduced this to a final inventory of 
60 items in order to achieve a replicable five-factor structure of social axioms. Schwartz (1992) 
began from the established base of the 36-item Rokeach Values Survey and does not detail how 
he added items for his final inventory of 56 values. We believe that these differences in item 
selection and elimination are highly informative. Values are a constrained domain, where all 
human beings face similar questions about how to prioritize concerns about biological, social, 
and group-based needs (Schwartz, 1992). Item selection and elimination in the values domain 
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can therefore proceed in a more theory-driven manner, whereas the realm of social axioms is 
constrained only by linguistic expressions (A is related to B) and human imagination. Although 
Leung and Bond (2004) do not provide further analyses of items that were excluded from their 
final item inventories, we surmise that like historical events, there might be particular social 
axioms that do not fit into a universal factor structure but have important culture-specific impact.
As different cultures rub shoulders with one another on an increasingly frequent basis, funda-
mental miscommunication as to the basic meaning of important historical symbols is becoming 
more of a problem. For instance, the United States has been excoriated by other countries for 
invading Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11 terrorist attacks (Pew Global Atti-
tudes Project, 2006) and subsequently lost considerable international prestige (Liu, Hanke et al., 
2009; Liu, Paez et al., 2009). But it may be that September 11 has fundamentally different asso-
ciative meanings for Americans compared to citizens of other countries that rendered these polit-
ical actions reasonable or even necessary to Americans in a way that is incomprehensible to 
citizens of other states. Similarly, the Nanjing Massacre may carry associative meanings for main-
land Chinese that bring it into fundamental miscommunication and symbolic conflict with neigh-
boring nationalities like the Japanese (Atsumi & Suwa, 2009; Liu & Atsumi, 2008).
Given that we allow for both culture-general and culture-specific effects for the perception of 
world history, specifying criteria for item generation is critical to identifying not only meaning-
ful dimensions of cross-cultural variation but historical events with potentially global implica-
tions that cannot fit within a universal structure of associative meaning. Because of the lack of 
theoretical consensus, the primary criterion we used was prior empirical research. We included 
in the event inventory of the World History Survey all events nominated in the Top 10 by two or 
more cultures as reported in Liu et al. (2005) and Liu, Paez et al. (2009).2 This produced a list of 
31 events (see Table 1) that was augmented by events chosen for specific theoretical purposes: 
The Foundation of the United Nations, Decolonization, and the Rise of Islamic Civilization were 
only nominated in one country but were deemed important enough to be included. The 30 Years 
War was a conflict between Catholics and Protestants that decimated Germany in the 17th century 
that together with the Invention of the Printing Press were chosen to represent events of vast 
importance in previous eras that seem to not be salient in open-ended nominations. The Rise of 
the European Union, the Digital Age (Computers, Internet), and Global Warming were chosen 
as events of significant importance to the future that may have been underestimated. Finally, the 
Creation/Evolution of Humanity was chosen because the empirical survey disallowed events of 
greater than 1,000 years antiquity, and we wanted to better ascertain the place given to prehistory 
in overall ratings of world history. This event inventory is both comprehensive and content rich 
and allows us to articulate the remaining (less central) goals for investigation:
Subgoal 3: to articulate empirical criteria for item deletion from cross-cultural survey 
inventories and to generate an inventory of culturally significant events in world his-
tory that lack universal meaning.
Subgoal 4: to ascertain whether among these historical events deleted from a general cross-
cultural inventory there might be events influencing willingness to fight in particular 
cultures (particularly the superpowers of the United States and China).
Method
Participants
Data were collected initially from 6,023 university students who were citizens of 30 societies 
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Fiji, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
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Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia, and the 
United States). Social science students were preferred, and specialists majoring in history were 
avoided. Each society, which for convenience sake we sometimes refer to as a “country”,3 was 
subjected to a missing data analysis, and cases with more than 33% missing values were excluded 
from the overall analyses (99 cases). We calculated for each participant the individual standard 
deviation across all relevant items (40 historical events and figures, evaluation, and importance 
ratings). Participants who had a standard deviation of 0 (indicating no variability in responses) 
were also excluded from the overall sample (124 cases).
Thus, participants were in total 5,800 university students (61.1% were female, 35.9% were 
male, and 3% did not indicate their gender). Participants’ age ranged from 16 to 66 (M = 21.39, 
SD = 4.47), with country means ranging from 19.0 (Philippines) to 27.3 (Australia). Sample sizes 
ranged from 113 (Japan) to 330 (Philippines) with a mean sample size of 193.
Procedure and Materials
The questionnaire was administered to university students from a range of different academic 
disciplines. The survey consisted of two sets of 40 historical events and 40 historical figures. All 
questionnaires were translated from their original language into the language prevalent in the 
society of administration and back-translated to ensure correct translation. The participants 
were asked to evaluate first 40 historical events and then 40 historical figures on a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from extremely negative (1) to extremely positive (7) followed by an impor-
tance rating from not at all important (1) to extremely important (7). We will focus only on the 
evaluation of the 40 events in this article.
Results
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), Factor Analysis, and Scale Construction
Table 1 shows all events sorted by descending means across all samples. While it was clear that 
events associated with the progress of civilization (at the top of Table 1) were rated highly whereas 
events associated with war, terror, and environmental catastrophe were rated negatively across 
cultures, their relationship with one another is likely to be contextualized within culturally derived 
systems of meaning.
Determining underlying dimensions of meaning. According to Welkenhuysen-Gybels and van de 
Vijver (2001), when operating with 30 configurations of raw data from 30 societies, the likeli-
hood is very high that many of the configurations will differ from one another and yield a very 
poor fit in terms of the underlying dimensions of meaning for the items across cultures.
To confirm this, we initially employed metric MDS with proximity transformations into 
z-transformed Euclidean distances for each country separately, across all countries using indi-
vidual level data with PROXimity SCALing (Proxscal). Therefore, we conducted 31 MDS pro-
cedures, based on raw data from 30 countries and on one z-standardized overall configuration 
allowing from one- up to six-dimensional solutions. A representation in one dimension accounted 
for .74 of the dispersion (normalized raw stress = .24, Tucker’s coefficient of congruence = .87); 
for two dimensions .89, .11, and .95, respectively; for three dimensions .94, .06, and .97; for four 
.96, .04, and .98; for five .98, .02, and .99; and finally for six .98, .02, and .99. Subsequently, we 
performed generalized procrustes analysis (GPA; Borg & Groenen, 1997; Commandeur, 1991) 
to compare all configurations with one another simultaneously and to transform the configurations 
to maximal correspondence, arbitrarily treating the overall data set as equivalent and homogenous 
(see also Welkenhuysen-Gybels & van de Vijver, 2001). As expected, the centroid configuration 
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could only account for 55% of the squared distances for two dimensions and 52% for three dim-
ensions. This low level of congruence indicates a lack of universal fit across cultures in the evalu-
ation of historical events.
A plausible alternative to universality is to identify homogenous partitions of societies that 
show similarities within a cluster. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated for 
all items to provide an index of the expected correlation for evaluations of each historical event 
between two randomly selected people from the same country. A higher ICC indicates a higher 
Table 1. Mean Evaluations of Events With Their Standard Deviations and Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficients Across All 30 Societies
Event M SD ICC
Abolition of Slavery (19th century) 6.07 1.58 .20
Invention of Printing Press 5.92 1.31 .09
Digital Age (Computers, Internet) 5.72 1.39 .04
Creation/Evolution of Humanity 5.65 1.52 .11
Man on the Moon/Space Travel 5.50 1.41 .06
Women’s Emancipation & Suffrage 5.42 1.93 .25
Industrial Revolution 5.37 1.43 .06
Rise of Ancient Civilizations 5.30 1.38 .08
Renaissance (15th century) 5.21 1.36 .13
Foundation of United Nations 5.19 1.45 .06
Fall of Berlin Wall/End of USSR 5.11 1.59 .18
Decolonization 5.08 1.57 .17
Discovery of Americas 4.93 1.52 .07
Rise of European Union 4.83 1.40 .13
French Revolution 4.72 1.41 .10
American (War of) Independence 4.68 1.41 .09
Foundation of the Major Religions 4.34 1.59 .10
Rise of Islamic Civilization 4.26 1.41 .12
Cultural Revolution (China) 4.15 1.55 .20
Age of Discovery/Colonization 4.15 1.68 .13
Russian Revolution (1917) 3.88 1.36 .05
Partition of India and Pakistan 3.82 1.21 .06
American Civil War 3.77 1.43 .05
30 Years War (17th century) 3.22 1.29 .05
Sino-Japanese War (1930s) 3.07 1.31 .03
Opium War (China, 19th century) 3.01 1.38 .03
Islam-Christian Wars/Crusades (11th to 14th century) 2.98 1.48 .11
Great Depression (1930s) 2.86 1.36 .06
Cold War 2.73 1.43 .06
Vietnam War 2.43 1.38 .10
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2.38 1.38 .09
World War I 2.21 1.51 .07
World War II 2.17 1.65 .10
Sept 11 Bombing 2.11 1.48 .10
Asian Tsunami (2004) 2.05 1.40 .09
Iraq War (2005) 2.02 1.32 .04
Holocaust 1.96 1.46 .20
Global Warming 1.93 1.42 .06
Atomic Bombings 1.89 1.46 .15
Terrorism (terror bombings) 1.68 1.26 .05
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proportion of consistency in variability accounted for at the between-country level relative to 
variability between individuals. As seen in Table 1, significant amounts of variation were avail-
able to be accounted for at the country level, especially for items like Women’s Emancipation, 
the Holocaust, and the Cultural Revolution (ICCs above .20), and less for others with ICCs 
as low as .03.
Therefore, we conducted a country-level hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method to 
combine data sets from different countries into coherent groups. The cluster analysis converged 
on three clusters: a mainly Western (Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Hungary, Portugal, Brazil, United States, and Bulgaria) and two 
mainly non-Western country clusters (first cluster: China, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, Taiwan, 
and Tunisia; second cluster: Canada, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia).
We then conducted an interval-level MDS with proximity transformations for each cluster 
separately using the individual-level data. Euclidean distances were calculated from z-transformed 
mean scores of 40 evaluations of historical events (MDS between variables) using Proxscal. 
Therefore, we employed three MDS procedures, based on three clusters (using z-scores) consid-
ering one- up to six-dimensional solutions. A representation in one dimension accounted for .74 
of the dispersion (normalized raw stress = .26, Tucker’s coefficient of congruence = .87); for two 
dimensions .90, .10, and .95, respectively; for three dimensions .94, .06, and .97; for four .97, .03, 
and .98; for five .98, .02, and .99; and finally for six .98, .02, and .99. We examined the scree plot 
for the normalized raw stress that suggested a two-dimensional solution and chose the two-
dimensional solution as the most appropriate representation of the events.
Subsequently, we performed GPA (Borg & Groenen, 1997; Commandeur, 1991). GPA was 
used to compare all three configurations with one another simultaneously and to transform the 
configurations to maximal correspondence. GPA is for MDS what procrustean target rotation is 
for factor analysis. GPA rotates the coordinates of all configurations in such a way that they 
maximally correspond to one another. Furthermore, GPA provides congruence indices at con-
figuration and item level computed as the proportion of the squared distances accounted for by 
each cluster and for each item. Hence, we are able to detect items that do not fit well using the 
congruence measure at the item level. We reduced possible cross-cultural differences due to 
response sets and so forth through standardizing the means for each country separately before 
using the overall data set (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). The initial centroid configuration 
accounted for 76% of the squared distances for two dimensions, a big improvement on the solu-
tion derived from the individual countries.
To improve fit and to aim for a comparable structure across the three clusters, we detected items 
that had a poor fit using the ratio (0-1) between sum of squares fit per item divided by sum of 
squares total. We removed items that had a fit lower than .50 in three steps (details available from 
authors upon request). Some of these events are highly culture-specific and probably not well 
known outside of the involved countries: Opium War (China, 9th century), Sino-Japanese War 
(1930s), Partition of India and Pakistan, and (perhaps) the Russian Revolution (1917) as well. 
Other deleted events were likely to have contested meanings and referents across cultures: Islam-
Christian Wars/Crusades (11th to 14th century), French Revolution, Women’s Emancipation & 
Suffrage, foundation of the major religions, and Age of Discovery/Colonization. It should be noted 
that these are items that did not fit well within the dimensional space solutions, which is quite dif-
ferent from the items that have consistent variability accounted for at the country level by the ICC.
The total fit increased from .76 (40 events) to .90 (31 events) for the three cluster MDS solu-
tion (please see Figures 1 through 3 for MDS space for Western cluster, Non-Western Cluster 1, 
and Non-Western Cluster 2). We stopped here as we achieved a satisfactory total fit and had no 
items left below .50. While we gained a satisfactory proportion of fit through item deletions, we 
also lost culture-specific information by forcing an equivalent structure onto the data.
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Figure 1. Rotated MDS Configuration for 24 Events by Western Cluster
As can be seen from Figures 1 through 3, the location of events along the vertical axis was not 
only highly consistent across all three-dimensional spaces but also easily interpretable. This pri-
mary dimension of cross-cultural meaning in the evaluation of historical events distinguishes 
between historical calamities (wars, weapons of mass destruction, environmental disasters, ter-
rorism, ideological conflict, and economic depression) versus historical progress (technological, 
civilization, and social). Our sample did not distinguish sharply between human versus natural 
catastrophes, and hence warfare and genocide and economic and environmental calamities gath-
ered together towards the upper halves of Figures 1 through 3. The second, horizontal dimension 
was less stable across clusters and harder to interpret. Tentatively, we speculate that it may have 
something to do with Western forms of modernity and resistance to this modernity. The events 
to the right side mainly concern the overthrow of hegemony and inequality on the pathway 
towards modernity in Western societies (the 30 Years War, the American Civil War, American 
Independence, but also the Discovery of the Americas, which fits this interpretation from a set-
tler, not an indigenous, perspective). The other end of the horizontal dimension on the left side 
was anchored by China’s Cultural Revolution, the Rise of Islamic Civilization, the Holocaust, 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the Great Depression, all events that could be seen as 
some form of resistance or obstacle to Western forms of modernity. There were many events that 
did not hold consistent horizontal positions across the different dimensional solutions, like the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Vietnam War, the End of the Soviet Union, Decolonization, and even 
the Invention of the Printing Press, suggesting that the meaning of these terms varied in different 
parts of the world. The second dimension is weak and might not be able to bear careful scrutiny.
Scale construction and structural equivalence. In the next step, we aimed for scales that had equiv-
alent meaning across the 30 societies. We employed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with a 
principal components analysis followed by Varimax rotation on individual-level data to identify 
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factors that were structurally equivalent and to detect items that were not equivalent. Factorial 
procrustean target rotation (using the overall sample as the norm) was used subsequently (van de 
Vijver & Leung, 1997). The EFA revealed a three-factor structure across the three clusters. The 
scree test as well as parallel analysis suggested a three-factor structure, although the overall pro-
portion of explained variance was relatively low (35%). We accept that due to events elimination, 
we were losing information that potentially could have explained more variance in some regions. 
Nevertheless, by using the EFA to inspect the factor structure across the three clusters, and then 
using procrustean target rotation to identify poorly fitting items after target rotation, we further 
reduced the set of events, as seven of them did not fit well, because they had either cross-loadings, 
loadings on a different factor, or a high square root of the mean squared difference per item after 
the target rotation: September 11 Bombing, Discovery of Americas, 30 Years War (17th century), 
Rise of Islamic Civilization, Invention of Printing Press, Rise of Ancient Civilizations, and 
Chinese Cultural Revolution (please see Table 2 for all excluded events).
Tucker’s phi (proportionality coefficient) indicated a very high factorial agreement (between 
.96 and 1.00) for the remaining events organized as three subfactors across all three clusters. In 
general, factorial agreement coefficients higher than 0.95 indicate factorial similarity, whereas 
values lower than .90 are taken as a sign of incongruities (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Due to 
the high values of the factorial agreement indexes, it is valid to assume that all subscales had the 
same structure across the three clusters.
It should be noted that some of the deleted items anchored the previously described dimen-
sional solutions, and so we can see the costs of item elimination to achieve equivalence in mean-
ing. Like in the previous round of item elimination, the items either contained culture-specific 
content not well known globally (Chinese Cultural Revolution, Opium War, 30 Years War), diffuse 
Figure 2. Rotated MDS Configuration for 24 Events by Non-Western Cluster 1
 at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on January 12, 2012jcc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Liu et al. 261
wordings (Rise of Ancient Civilizations, Foundation of Major Religions), or have contested 
meanings (French Revolution, September 11, Discovery of the Americas, Rise of Islamic Civili-
zation, Islam-Christian Wars/Crusades, Women’s Emancipation and Suffrage).
We labeled the first, strongest factor as “Historical Calamities,” the second factor as “Histori-
cal Progress,” and the third factor as “Historical Resistance to Oppression” (please see Table 3 
for details). The first factor was exactly the same as represented in the upper half of the dimen-
sional space shown in Figures 1 through 3, with the exception of September 11, which was 
deleted to achieve higher reliability. The Historical Calamities scale, which does not differentiate 
between human-made or natural, intentional, or unintentional calamities, has robust reliabilities 
across country clusters and high interitem correlations that suggest that this concept is meaning-
ful across the 30 societies surveyed.
The second and third factors are less robust, as evidenced by scale reliabilities and by the 
inconsistent location of some items from these scales across the three-dimensional spaces. The 
Historical Progress scale (see Table 3) includes technological and political events indicative of 
civilization advance in recent times, like the Digital Age, Man on the Moon, the Foundation of 
the European Union and United Nations, but also the Creation/Evolution of Humanity. The 
weakest factor, Historical Resistance to Oppression, includes the two great American internal wars, 
the Abolition of Slavery and Decolonization and the Fall of the Berlin Wall/End of USSR but 
also the Renaissance. The spread of items in all three scales across the horizontal dimension of 
historical representations seen in Figures 1 through 3 indicates how weak this second dimension 
was compared to the first dimension. The inclusion of ancient items with recent items in the latter 
two scales seems to suggest that temporal constraint is not critical to these concepts.
Figure 3. Rotated MDS Configuration for 24 Events by Non-Western Cluster 2
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Multilevel Analyses
Having created our historical concepts, we then turned to their use in predicting willingness to 
fight for one’s country. We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to test a model in which 
evaluations of World War II and September 11 predicted the willingness to fight in a future war 
(yij) of each participant (subscripted i) within each country or society (subscripted j). HLM is a 
powerful statistical technique that calculates both individual-level(i) and society/country-level(j) 
contributions to variance in the dependent variable and hence is ideally suited to modeling cross-
cultural data.
We then extended this model to examine the unique effects of World War II and September 11 
evaluations and our new scales of Historical Calamities, Historical Progress, and Historical Resis-
tance to Oppression. Following recommendations outlined by Enders and Tofighi (2007), evalua-
tions of World War II (and all other predictors subsequently discussed) were group-mean centered 
in this analysis, because we were interested primarily in the associations between variables at the 
individual level (i.e., Level 1 associations). At Level 1, the equation was expressed as follows:
yij = β0j + β1j(World War II evaluation) + β2j(September 11 +  
 β3j(Historical Calamities) + β4j(Historical Progress) +  (1.1.) β5j(Historical Resistance) + rij
The Level 2 model then specified that each β coefficient was expressed as a function of a 
fixed and random component, as follows:
 Intercept β0j = γ00 + u0j
 World War II evaluations β1j = γ10 + u1j
 September 11 β2j = γ20 + u2j (2.1)
 Historical Calamities β3j = γ30 + u3j
 Historical Progress β4j = γ40 + u4j
 Historical Resistance β5j = γ50 + u5j
Table 2. List of Excluded Historical Events (Without Universal Meaning)
Excluded Events
 1. Islam-Christian Wars/Crusades (11th to 14th century)
 2. French Revolution 
 3. Opium War (China, 9th century)
 4. Sino-Japanese War (1930s)
 5. Women’s Emancipation & Suffrage
 6. Russian Revolution (1917)
 7. Foundation of the Major Religions
 8. Age of Discovery/Colonization 
 9. Partition of India and Pakistan
10. September 11 Bombing
11. Discovery of Americas
12. 30 Years War (17th century)
13. Rise of Islamic Civilization
14. Invention of Printing Press
15. Rise of Ancient Civilizations
16. Cultural Revolution (China)
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The average of the slopes for the relation between World War II evaluations and willingness 
to fight across countries is represented by γ10, and γ20 represents the average of the slopes for the 
relation between September 11 evaluations and willingness to fight, controlling for the effects 
of Historical Calamities,4 Historical Progress, and Historical Resistance to oppression, and u1j 
and u2j represent respective variation in the slopes of the effects of World War II and September 11 
evaluations on willingness to fight across countries. Likewise, γ30 represents the average of the 
slopes for the relation between Historical Calamities and willingness to fight across countries, 
controlling for all other predictors, and u3j represents variation in the slopes of the effect of 
Historical Calamities on willingness to fight across countries. As with a normal (fixed-effects) 
regression, this analysis therefore allowed us to evaluate the unique effects of World War II 
evaluations, September 11, Historical Calamities, Historical Progress, and Historical Resistance 
to oppression on willingness to fight averaged across countries, while (unlike in a fixed effects 
regression) also recognizing that these slopes might vary across different countries or societies 
(as represented by the u terms assessing Level 2 error).
Table 3. Overall Factor Loadings, Cronbach’s Alpha, Mean Interitem Correlation, and Tucker’s Phi for 
“Historical Calamities,” “Historical Progress,” and “Historical Resistance to Oppression”
Event Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
“Historical Calamities” (αoverall = .85; αWestern = .82, αnon-Western1 = .82; αnon-Western2 = .84 overall mean 
interitem correlation = .32; Tucker’s Phi = 1.00, 1.00, .99)
World War I 0.74 0.01 0.06
World War II 0.73 0.04 0.04
Atomic Bombings 0.62 0.01 −0.05
Vietnam War 0.58 0.00 −0.04
Terrorism (terror bombings) 0.57 −0.21 −0.04
Cold War 0.56 −0.02 0.13
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 0.56 −0.03 −0.14
Iraq War (2005) 0.55 0.05 −0.09
Asian Tsunami (2004) 0.55 −0.19 −0.07
Global Warming 0.53 −0.03 −0.16
Holocaust 0.51 0.02 −0.21
Great Depression (1930s) 0.46 −0.14 0.10
“Historical Progress” (αoverall = .65; αWestern = .65, αnon-Western1 = .65; αnon-Western2 = .65; overall mean 
interitem correlation = .24; Tucker’s Phi = .99, .98, .96)
Digital Age (Computers, Internet) 0.03 0.71 −0.07
Man on the Moon/Space Travel −0.06 0.64 0.05
Creation/Evolution of Humanity −0.07 0.54 0.19
Industrial Revolution 0.03 0.53 0.31
Rise of European Union −0.03 0.53 0.18
Foundation of United Nations −0.13 0.44 0.21
“Historical Resistance to Oppression” (αoverall = .59; αWestern = .50, αnon-Western1 = .56; αnon-Western2 = .57; 
overall mean interitem correlation = .19; Tucker’s Phi = .99, .97, .96)
American Civil War 0.28 −0.07 0.55
American (War of) Independence 0.06 0.22 0.54
Abolition of Slavery (19th century) −0.20 0.05 0.51
Renaissance (15th century) −0.10 0.19 0.51
Fall of Berlin Wall/End of USSR −0.05 0.21 0.50
Decolonization −0.15 0.12 0.50
Note. Bold factor loadings represent items included in the final scales
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The γ-coefficients (intercept and slopes) for the fixed-effects parts of these models and associ-
ated u-terms representing variation in slopes and intercepts across countries (random part of 
model) are presented in Table 4. As shown, evaluations of World War II significantly predicted 
an increased willingness to go to war when entered at Step 1 (γ = .08, t = 2.83, p < .01). The 
γ-coefficient for this effect can be interpreted as an unstandardized regression coefficient and 
indicates that a one-unit increase in evaluations of World War II predicted a .08 unit increase in 
willingness to fight for one’s country (keeping in mind that both variables were measured on 
scales ranging from 1 to 7). Analyses of the random part of the model indicated that there was 
significant variation across countries in the slope for this effect (u = .01), χ2(29) = 89.37, p < .01. 
Thus, while the slopes were heterogeneous across countries, of critical interest for our purposes, 
the average slope across all countries was significant. Evaluations of September 11, in contrast, 
did not predict unique variance in willingness to fight (γ = −.03, t = −1.54, p = .14), and the slope 
for this effect did not differ significantly across countries (u = .01), χ2(29) = 40.33, p = 08.
As detailed in Equations 1.1 and 2.1, we entered Historical Calamities, Historical Progress, 
and Historical Resistance as additional predictors at Step 2. This allowed us to examine unique 
effects of World War II evaluations, September 11 evaluations, and these other three more broad-
bandwidth evaluative aspects of historical perceptions simultaneously. As shown in the lower 
half of Table 4, evaluations of World War II (γ = −.01, t = −.22, p = .82) no longer predicted 
willingness to fight after controlling for the historical scales. Rather, this model indicated that 
more positive evaluations of Historical Calamities (γ = .27, t = 2.56, p = .02) and Historical 
Progress (γ = .21, t = 4.96, p < .01) both uniquely predicted an increased willingness to fight for 
one’s country. These coefficients for the fixed-effects part of the model indicate that a one-unit 
increase in positivity of evaluations of Historical Calamities and Progress in human history, 
respectively, predicted .27 and .21 unit increases in willingness to fight for one’s country. Finally, 
examination of the random part of the model (as shown in Table 4) showed that slopes for both of 
these relations varied significantly. Thus, the magnitude of these effects was not homogenous 
across countries.5
Table 4. Coefficients for the Fixed and Random Components of Nested Multilevel Models Assessing 
the Effects of Historical Evaluations on Willingness to Fight for One’s Country Across Cultures
Fixed Part Random Part
γ SE t u χ2
Step 1
Intercept 4.10 .16 25.13* .78 1093.67*
World War II .08 .03 2.83* .01 89.37*
September 11 −.03 .02 −1.43 .01 40.33
Step 2
Intercept 4.14 .16 25.68* .76 728.05*
World War II −.01 .03 −.22 .01 48.52*
September 11 −.04 .03 −1.49 50.53*
Historical Calamities .27 .11 2.56* .21 131.39*
Historical Resistance .01 .04 .36 .01 44.30
Historical Progress .21 .04 4.96* .04 62.88*
Note. The residual Level 1 variance component at Step 1 (r in equation 1.0) was 2.91. The residual Level 1 variance 
component at Step 2 (r in equation 1.1) was 1.70. All effects remained nearly identical when additional analyses were 
conducted with a version of the Historical Calamities scale that did not include World War II evaluations as part of 
that scale. Evaluations of World War II specifically remained nonsignificant in this alternative model (γ = .01, t = .60,  
p = .55), and evaluations of Historical Calamities remained significant and comparable in magnitude (γ = .25, t = 2.57, 
p = .02).
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We conducted additional analyses testing whether contrast coded differences in the three regional 
clusters moderated the relationship between Historical Calamities, Historical Resistance, and 
Historical Progress on willingness to fight. We examined this possibility by including two 
dummy coded Level 2 variables representing Western nations versus non-Western Cluster 1 (0,1) 
and Western nations versus non-Western Cluster 2 (0,1) as predictors of each of the Level 1 
slopes defined in equation 2.1. This analysis therefore compared the average slope for each non-
Western cluster of nations with the average slope for Western nations. Importantly, all slopes 
reported in Table 4 remained significant when these additional variables were included. Analysis 
of main effects indicated that nations included in the two non-Western national clusters expressed 
greater overall willingness to fight than Western nations (γ = .75, t = 2.09, p < .05, and γ = 1.13, 
t = 3.72, p < .01). Interestingly, results from this additional analysis also indicated that Historical 
Calamities predicted increased Willingness to Fight in Western Nations (slopes = .58 and .58) 
but not in either of the non-Western clusters (slopes = −.05 and −.05, respectively). It seems that 
the main effect of Historical Calamities on willingness to fight is driven by Western nations and may 
increase willingness to fight to a similar mean level to that in non-Western national clusters.
Finally, we conducted analyses testing whether specific events that might be of relevance to a 
particular country exerted more predictive utility there. This did not appear to be the case for any 
of the events tested, including the Russian Revolution for Russia and the Partition of India and 
Pakistan for India. For instance, consistent with the multilevel (cross-cultural) analyses, evalua-
tions of September 11 did not significantly predict willingness to fight in the United States when 
data for this nation were examined separately (β = −.11, t = −1.42, p = .16). Similarly, evaluations 
of the Sino-Japanese war did not predict unique variance in willingness to fight in China (β = −.02, 
t = −.15, p = .88). Controlling for World War II evaluations made no difference in either case.
Graphical Representations at the Country Level
Our final analyses involved country- or societal-level graphical representations of the historical 
concepts (and willingness to fight). As seen on the vertical axis of Figure 4, non-Western societ-
ies almost without exception evaluated Historical Calamities much less negatively than Western 
societies (the sole “exception” being Russia, but there has been considerable debate about 
whether Russia is a Western society). The pattern of scores on the horizontal axis of Historical 
Progress is not as easy to interpret: the highest scoring countries (Portugal, China, Tunisia, and 
Bulgaria) are those that aspire to Historical Progress rather than having necessarily internalized 
the events contained within this concept. The lowest scoring societies (Malaysia, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Indonesia) are, except for Switzerland, modernizing Asian societ-
ies that have had difficult experiences emulating the largely Western ideals of historical progress 
represented in this concept. If we consider the diagonal between the two axes, China and Tunisia 
are two countries that rate Historical Progress highly and do not see Historical Calamities as all 
that terrible, whereas at the other end of the diagonal, Switzerland, Norway, Australia, and 
New Zealand, all highly progressive and prosperous countries, do not rate Historical Progress 
that highly and consider Historical Calamities to be horrific. Brazil is at the middle of the diagonal, 
whereas furthest away from the diagonal Portugal rates progress highly and calamities as horri-
ble and Malaysia does not rate calamities as horrific and does not consider progress to be that 
great. These data suggest that the structure and naming of our second factor as “Historical Progress” 
could use fine-tuning, as peoples could vary considerably in their subjective experiences with 
events that could be considered as “progress” (see Gibson & Noret, 2010). We are much more 
confident of the meaning of Historical Calamities across cultures, as this appears to fit in nicely 
with Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) cross-cultural dimension of survival versus self-expression, 
with non-Western societies seeing Historical Calamities as part of the process of survival and 
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progress and Western societies seeing them as something horrible located in an unthinkable past 
unrelated to current self-expression motives.
Country-level means for Historical Calamities (vertical axis) plotted against those for willing-
ness to fight for one’s country (horizontal axis, see Figure 5) reinforce the interpretation above. 
The non-Western samples not only score higher on their evaluations of Historical Calamities, 
but the visible country-level correlation of this with willingness to fight along the diagonal shows 
that the non-Western samples tend also to be more willing to fight. Russia’s location on this 
space is in line with non-Western rather than Western societies, whereas Japan’s location is sin-
gularly low in willingness to fight (see Atsumi & Suwa, 2009; Liu & Atsumi, 2008) compared to 
its relative acceptance of calamities.
Discussion
MDS analyses indicated that no single universal dimensional space provided adequate fit for 
evaluations of events in world history across 30 societies. Hierarchical cluster analysis ascertained 
that an adequate two-dimensional solution could be found by putting societies with relatively 
homogeneous patterns of associations between events into three clusters, one Western and two 
non-Western. Through item deletions, a single strong, virtually universal dimension of evaluation 















































Figure 4. Visual Representation of All Thirty Societies by “Historical Calamities” and “Historical 
Progress”
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the other. The second dimension, tentatively identified as modernity versus resistance to moder-
nity, was both empirically and theoretically less robust. Lack of consensus on this dimension 
thwarted identification of universal dimensions across the 30 societies analyzed individually.
Nevertheless, factor analysis and item deletions indicated that three concepts could be identi-
fied with reasonably good structural equivalence across cultures. The first, most powerful factor 
in the evaluation of events in world history across cultures was Historical Calamities, an inven-
tory of disasters both man-made and natural, both intentional and unintentional, encompassing 
catastrophes of warfare, economic collapse, genocide, and terrorism. The second two factors 
represent the other end of the continuum from calamity to progress, but our names for them are 
tentative, Historical Progress and Historical Resistance to Oppression, because scale reliabilities 
and theoretical interpretation was less than robust. They signal that while there is massive agree-
ment across cultures as to what constitutes historical calamity, there is far less consensus as to 
what constitutes progress. The items on the Historical Progress scale are mostly Western in ori-
gin, and it is understandable that different non-Western societies might have different opinions 
as to their merit and the merit of following in their footsteps. Similarly, Historical Resistance to 
Oppression would appear to be a relatively coherent concept to Western societies, but for non-













































Figure 5. Visual Representation of All Thirty Societies by “Historical Calamities” and “Willingness to 
Fight for One’s Country”
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War and War of Independence and the Fall of the Berlin Wall/End of the USSR could be highly 
contested. As a whole, these patterns suggest that lay knowledge, imagination, and beliefs about 
history are far more coherent concerning calamity than progress.
Despite these reservations, we found using HLM that Historical Calamities was a powerful 
predictor of willingness to fight and Historical Progress a decent predictor after controlling for 
one another and the specific events of World War II and September 11. There was significant 
variation in slopes at the country level, indicating that the relationship between our predictor 
variables and the dependent variable varied across cultures. Replicating Paez et al. (2008), evalu-
ations of World War II were significantly correlated to willingness to fight, but new findings 
were that it had no independent predictive value after controlling for the scales. September 11 
was not correlated with willingness to fight for one’s country, even in the United States. Indeed, we 
were unable to find a single historical event able to predict willingness to fight beyond the scales. 
Finding culture-specific effects for an event would probably require more in-depth probing of 
the meaning of these events as imbedded within culture-specific contexts (Gibson & Noret, 2010; 
Liu et al., 2010).
Participants from non-Western countries rated Historical Calamities as less negative or less 
horrific than Western countries, and they also reported more willingness to fight for their coun-
tries, but they did not glorify past conflicts or see them as positive. The results for Historical 
Calamities were consistent with previous research by Basabe and Valencia (2007) showing that 
societies with more materialistic, collectivist, and hierarchical values had less negative views 
towards sociopolitically sanctioned violence and warfare. The shift to a postmaterialistic society 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000) is typically associated with a shift toward a representation of warfare 
that focuses on victims, suffering, and the meaningless of war (Rosoux, 2001) and hence a reduc-
tion in willingness to fight. In addition to this, we found that a mixed bag of societies endorsed 
our concept of “Historical Progress,” with correlations suggesting that members of these societ-
ies appeared to be willing to fight in order to achieve progress.
Methodologically, during the process of analysis, we deleted 16 events or 40% of the original 
item inventory from our final scales. We used two separate criteria for item deletion, first fit 
indices derived from generalized procrustean analysis of MDS solutions and second measures of 
fit derived from both exploratory and generalized procrustean rotation factor analysis. The list of 
deleted events in Table 2 included culture-specific events like Opium War and September 11 
critical for particular societies but less relevant across cultures. There is another set of events that 
are likely to have disputed or inconsistent meanings across cultures, like Women’s Emancipation 
and Suffrage or the Age of Discovery/Colonization.6 Finally, there was a set of items where the 
referent of the event itself is not clear from the wording, like the Foundation of the Major Reli-
gions and/or the Invention of the Printing Press (where it is unknown whether participants were 
thinking about the Chinese invention or the European popularization that followed); these word-
ings were chosen to save space (e.g., rather than refer to Christianity and Islam with separate items), 
but in retrospect this was methodologically flawed. We consider this inventory of excluded 
events to be useful because (a) events of the first type could be explored more deeply in culture-
specific studies and (b) events of the second type could be explored more deeply in cross-cultural 
qualitative studies.
Representations of world history are not theoretically constrained in the same way as values 
or social axioms; rather, new events are always entering into and updating current representations 
because of a recency bias in collective remembering (Liu et al., 2005; Liu, Paez et al., 2009). 
Because of the mixture of ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism that permeates perceptions, it may be 
difficult to identify universal perspectives on world history besides agreement on the nature of 
catastrophe. But acknowledgement of such limitations is itself a useful scientific advance. In the 
theory of history and identity articulated by Liu and Hilton (2005), history provides raw materials 
 at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on January 12, 2012jcc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Liu et al. 269
or a “symbolic reserve” that through a process of communication driven by the agenda of politi-
cal elites is transformed into legitimizing ideologies and discourses that are both a powerful 
influence on political decisions and become enduring elements of political culture (see also Liu & 
Sibley, 2009). The present study identifies for the first time a potential “symbolic reserve” of 
Historical Calamities that can be mobilized by political entrepreneurs (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 
2007; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) in the international arena to justify and explain their future 
political agendas across cultures, whereas previous research focused only on country-specific 
events and discourses (e.g., Liu et al., 1999; Sibley et al., 2008). This concept is malleable, with 
content reflecting current events like terrorism and global warming, but also enduring, anchored 
in symbols like World War I and World War II. Historical Calamities, unlike the less coherent 
concepts of Historical Progress and Historical Resistance to Oppression, are likely to be under-
stood in the same way across cultures and thereby provide a useful platform of commonality 
from which to construct global political agenda against future shared threats. Political entrepre-
neurs of global society in the 21st century may find that they can mobilize their agendas for the 
future by appealing to rather broader notions of shared calamities rather than resorting to more 
ethnocentric notions of specific historical events of cultural significance.
The present research is a first step in quantifying world history representations across cul-
tures. Future research should examine how they relate to more presumably stable elements of 
cultures, like values, social axioms, or cultural syndromes like individualism-collectivism 
(Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). While one sure path forward is to correlate country-level indices of 
historical representations with other important cross-cultural variables, we highlight another 
approach that may illuminate the concept of political culture in a more fundamental way. We 
have repeatedly asserted and empirically demonstrated that historical representations are dynamic 
features with both universal and culture-specific aspects. Because they are dynamic, we can 
theorize about whether particular historical representations may be caused by other, more endur-
ing cultural patterns. Paez et al. (2008) and Basabe and Valencia (2007) have argued (using cor-
relational data only) that the collective remembering of warfare as “necessary and just” is a 
product of a major recent victorious war together with hierarchical and authoritarian values. If 
they are correct, a violent and aggressive political culture would be a function of both enduring 
values and recent success in war. Theoretically, this means that there must be at least two distinct 
paths for the cultural transmission of cultures of violence or peace: one through bottom-up insti-
tutions like the family (values) and the other through the top-down machinery of the state (social 
or collective memory; see Olick & Robbins, 1998).
History enters into this process by providing raw material (e.g., September 11, the Nanjing 
Massacre) that is shaped by political elites to create political agendas for their nations. These 
political agendas do more than reflect a “social memory” of the past, they create a social reality 
for the future (Hopkins & Reicher, 1997). If national political cultures are considered as dynamic 
configurations of social identity, social representations of history, and cultural syndromes, then 
just as a tradition of valuing high power distance and social hierarchy may predispose a people 
to adopt violent solutions to a political issue, a calamitous event may be mobilized by political 
elites to turn a low power distance and egalitarian culture towards violent solutions to political 
problems in a way that may have long-term consequences for that culture’s values. Parallel to the 
current investigations, we would benefit from having qualitative work across cultures into the 
systems of shared and unshared meaning that embed the pattern of correlations reported here into 
the political life of nations and our interconnected world.
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Notes
1. The exception being China, where there were substantial mismatches between theory and empirical 
findings (see Schwartz, 1992, p. 28 and 31).
2. The sole exception was the 1990s Gulf War, because it was deemed repetitive to other Middle Eastern 
conflicts and appeared only in the 1990s data set and not in the 2000s data set. Some items, like the Rise 
of Ancient Civilizations and Foundation of Major Religions, were amalgamated from more specific 
nominations.
3. We use the terms country and nation interchangeably in this article, as most of the societies in our sur-
vey are both countries and nations. Hong Kong is a society that has demonstrably distinct characteristics 
as a Special Administrative Region of China, and Taiwan is a sovereign society that is not recognized 
formally as such by most countries.
4. Historical Calamities was computed both with and without World War II, and the results were not 
affected by its inclusion or exclusion.
5. All analyses remained comparable to those reported in Table 4 after controlling for gender and age. 
Specifically, the effects of Historical Calamities (γ = .23, t = 2.40, p = .02) and Historical Progress (γ = .21, 
t = 4.81, p < .01) remained significant, and all other effects remained nonsignificant. Men expressed 
greater willingness to fight than women independent of historical variables (γ = .26, t = 2.92, p = .01).
6. This was a problem even during the item wording phase, as for Portuguese the Age of Discovery is 
gloriously separate from the negative impacts of Colonization.
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